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Comments
Forum Selection Clauses in Consumer
Contracts: An Unconscionable Thing
Happened on the Way to the Forum
I.

INTRODUCTION

An unsophisticated consumer from Washington state enters into
a contract with a sophisticated business entity doing business in
Florida. The consumer never has the opportunity to negotiate or
bargain for any of the terms of the contract. Can the business entity force the consumer to litigate in Florida? Yes, according to the
United States Supreme Court in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v.
Shute.1 While the Court regularly has upheld contractual forum
selection clauses, 2 Shute is the first Supreme Court decision to address such a clause between a business and a private consumer.'
A forum selection clause is an agreement between contracting
parties to litigate their dispute in a pre-selected forum.4 In the
standard situation, the contract is the product of negotiation between two businesses.5 Courts assume that the parties are aware of
the implications of agreeing to limit the forum in which a later case
may be brought.6 If the parties are not aware of such implications,
1. 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
2. See infra notes 43-66 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 103-31 and accompanying text.
4. ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS § 1.07 (2d ed. 1991). These
agreements are referred to as prorogation clauses in civil law countries. See Arthur Lenhoff, The Parties' Choice of Forum: "ProrogationAgreements," 15 RUTGERS L. REV. 414,
415 (1961). A typical agreement states:
It is agreed by and between [party a] and [party b] that all disputes and matters
whatsoever arising under, in connection with or incident to this Contract shall
be litigated, if at all, in and before a Court located in the State of [x], U.S.A., to
the exclusion of any other state or country.
Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1524.
5. Michael Gruson, Forum-Selection Clausesin Internationaland Interstate Commercial Agreements, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 133, 133-34.
6. Courts place the burden of proof on the party who violates a forum selection clause
and claims unenforceability. Id. at 152. In most cases, the party will be a plaintiff who
brought suit in a forum different from the one specified in the contract. Placing the
burden on the plaintiff is contrary to the general notion that deference be given to the
plaintiff's choice of forum. See sources cited infra note 17.
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general principles of contract law should nevertheless hold them to
the terms of the contract, absent fraud or other public policy
violations.7
This Comment focuses on the situation when a business has a
standard form contract containing a forum selection clause, which
private consumers must sign prior to receiving goods or services.
Such agreements are often called contracts of adhesion because
they are offered to the consumer on a "take it or leave it" basis.'
While the consumer is obligated to read the contract and is presumed to understand its terms, courts often scrutinize such contracts to protect consumers. 9
Accordingly, this Comment discusses the enforceability of forum selection clauses in contracts with private consumers. It first
discusses forum selection clauses in light of general contract principles and then examines prior Supreme Court cases addressing these
clauses. II The Comment next looks at two approaches courts have
taken to determine the enforceability of forum selection clauses in
standardized contracts aimed at private consumers. I Finally, this
Comment proposes that courts should scrutinize forum selection
clauses in contracts between businesses and consumers in light of
2
the principle of unconscionability.'
II. BACKGROUND

Courts confronted with forum selection clauses in standard form
contracts historically have disagreed as to whether such clauses violate public policy. I3 Typically, in a lawsuit involving a forum selection clause, the defendant will move to transfer under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a),' 4 prompting a determination of the enforceability of the
clause. While forum selection clauses in contracts between businesses are regularly enforced, those in standard form contracts
7. CASAD, supra note 4, § 3.01[5][c].
8. See infra notes 16-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of contracts of
adhesion.
9. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
10. See infra part II.
11. See infra parts III-IV.
12. See infra part V.
13. See infra part III.
14. Section 1404(a) provides:
For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of iustice, a district
court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it
might have been brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
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often receive stricter scrutiny.' 5
A. Forum Selection Clauses, Adhesion Contracts, and
Unconscionability
A standard form contract presented to a consumer on a "take it
or leave it" basis is a contract of adhesion.' 6 Generally, such contracts favor the offeror who is often in a superior economic position
and thus can dictate terms to an offeree. 7 The adherent to the
contract has no opportunity to bargain over many essential terms
and may not have even read the contract.'" Consequently, some
courts excuse a consumer from the duty to read holding that: 1)
the adherent did not assent to the terms of the contract or 2) a
term violates public policy or is unconscionable. 19
An adhesion contract, while presumptively enforceable,2 ° can be
unconscionable. 2 ' Courts traditionally have used the doctrine of
unconscionability to protect a consumer who entered into an inher15. Colonial Leasing Co. of New Eng. v. Best, 552 F. Supp. 605, 607 (D. Or. 1982)
(noting that forum selection clauses are less likely to be enforced if they appear in adhesion contracts).
16. For an excellent discussion of contracts of adhesion, see Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1983). These
contracts are also referred to as "boilerplate" agreements. The term "boilerplate" is defined as "language which is used commonly in documents having a definite meaning in
the same context without variation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 175 (6th ed. 1990).
17. James T. Gilbert, Choice of Forum Clauses in Internationaland Interstate Contracts, 65 Ky. L.J. 1, 36 n.200 (1976-77); see Addison Mueller, Contracts of Frustration,
78 YALE L.J. 576, 580 (1969) (describing an adhesion contract as "a contract that sticks
the helpless consumer with standard form clauses that he might not have agreed to if he
had actually had free choice"); e.g., Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189,
204 (2d Cir. 1955) (noting that in adhesion contracts "[t]he one party dictates its provisions; the other has no more choice in fixing those terms than he has about the weather").
18. See Rakoff, supra note 16, at 1179; JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO,
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 10-1 (3d ed. 1987); see also John A. Spanogle, Jr., Analyzing
UnconscionabilityProblems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931, 933 (1969) (noting that not only
does a typical buyer fail to read the terms, but that this buyer probably could not understand or change the terms even if the buyer had read the contract).
19. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 18, § 9-44; see, e.g., Union Ins. Soc'y of Canton, Ltd. v. S.S. Elikon, 642 F.2d 721, 722-23 (4th Cir. 1981) (obviating the duty to read
because forum clause in an adhesion contract violated public policy); Cutter v. Scott &
Fetzer Co., 510 F. Supp. 905, 908 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (excusing failure to read because preprinted forum clause was not the result of a free bargain); Bank of Indiana v. Holyfield,
476 F. Supp. 104, 111-12 (S.D. Miss. 1979) (excising clause in a contract of adhesion
because it was unreasonable). But see Credit Alliance Corp. v. Joshco Mining Corp., 90
F.R.D. 187, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that failure to read "does not warrant a finding of procedural unconscionability").
20. See Rakoff, supra note 16, at 1191.
21. See Lenhoff, supra note 4, at 438 (arguing that courts may be less inclined to
apply choice of forum clauses in contracts of adhesion than to individual transactions
arrived at by bargaining); see also Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Broetje, 545 F. Supp. 362, 366-
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ently unfair contract.22 Moreover, section 2-302 of the Uniform
Commercial Code ("UCC"1)23 governs a court's determination of
unconscionability in consumer contracts. The UCC applies to
transactions in goods between a business and a consumer.24 Courts
also apply the UCC by analogy to determine the unconscionability
of an agreement that does not involve a sale of goods.2"
Under the umbrella term "unconscionability" that both the
common law and the UCC employ, a court considers such factors
as fraud, duress, misrepresentation, and abuse of economic
power.26 In the landmark case of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,27 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held that a contract that is unconscionable when formed is unenforceable. Usually, in such a contract, the terms are unreasonably
favorable to the seller and the buyer has little choice but to accept
the terms as offered. 2 s Refusal to enforce an unconscionable con67 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (discussing principles of unconscionability as related to adhesion
contracts).
22. See Lenhoff, supra note 4, at 438; see also RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4.35 (2d ed. 1980) (discussing cases in which such
clauses were held to be unreasonable).
23. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1987). The provision states:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid
the court in making the determination.
Id
24. See U.C.C. § 2-102.
25. See EDWARD J. MURPHY & RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW
584 (4th ed. 1991) ("[I]t is only with the advent of UCC 2-302, limited to transactions in
goods but extended by analogy to other types of transactions, that courts began in earnest
to grapple with the ramifications of the unconscionability doctrine and to spell out specific content."); see also Diliman & Assoc., Inc. v. Capitol Leasing Co., 442 N.E.2d 311,
316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (holding that UCC provisions regarding unconscionability
should be applied by analogy to equipment lease cases); Wille v. Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 549 P.2d 903, 906 (Kan. 1976) ("Although the UCC's application is primarily limited to contracts for the present or future sale of goods, many courts have extended the
statute by analogy into other areas of the law or have used the doctrine as an alternative
basis for their holdings.").
26. See MODEL CHOICE OF FORUM ACT § 3(4) (1968); Gilbert, supra note 17, at 36.
27. 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
28. Id. The Walker-Thnma.v rn rt ctntpd th a, " ...
:..power, and hence little real choice, signs a commercially unreasonable contract with little
or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his consent, or even an objective
manifestation of his consent, was even given to all the terms." Id.
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tract prevents oppression and unfair surprise.2 a
In his frequently cited article on unconscionability, Professor
Arthur Leff divides unconscionability into two prongs: procedural
and substantive.3" Under procedural unconscionability, courts
should look for unfair surprise or an absence of meaningful
choice 3 ' by asking: was there a lack of knowledge on the part of
the buyer? To determine lack of knowledge, courts should consider the following: 1) the consumer's educational level; 32 2) the
lack of opportunity to study the contract and inquire about contract terms; 33 3) whether the clause was stated in overly technical
terms-too vague or difficult to understand;34 and 4) if there was a
lack of voluntariness on the part of the buyer.35
Under substantive unconscionability, courts should consider: 1)
whether the clause was unreasonably one-sided,36 oppressive, or
unfavorable to one party; 37 2) whether the creditor or seller unduly
expanded his own remedies; or 3) whether the buyer waived his
right to a remedy. 38 Following this analysis and in accordance
with section 2-302(2) of the UCC, courts should give the parties an
opportunity to present evidence regarding the questionable term.39
While courts have struggled to define the role forum selection
clauses play in contract law, the use of such clauses in standardized
29.
30.

Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionabilityand the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115

U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).

Subsequent authors have recognized the influence of this

distinction. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Bargain Principleand Its Limits, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 741, 752 (1982) (noting that the distinction between substantive and procedural
unconscionability "influenced much of the later analysis").
31. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1987); see Credit Alliance Corp. v. Joshco Mining Corp.,
90 F.R.D. 187, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that unconscionability occurs when there is
an absence of meaningful choice for one party).
32. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
see also Neal v. Lacob, 334 N.E.2d 435, 440 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (plaintiff was a college
graduate and an experienced businessman); Star Credit Corp. v. Ingram, 337 N.Y.S.2d
245, 248 (Civ. Ct. 1972) ("The courts must provide the necessary instrumentality to
pierce the shield of caveat emptor when it is sought to be used as a sword at the throats of
the poor and illiterate.").
33. John Deere Leasing Co. v. Blubaugh, 636 F. Supp. 1569, 1573 (D. Kan. 1986);
York v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1265, 1278 (N.D. Miss. 1984).
34. Jutta's Inc. v. Fireco Equip. Co., 375 A.2d 687, 690-91 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1977); Seabrook v. Commuter Hous. Co., 338 N.Y.S.2d 67, 71-72 (Civ. Ct. 1972).
35. Walker-Thomas Furniture, 350 F.2d at 449; Seabrook, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 72.
36. Tulowitzki v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 396 A.2d 956, 960 (Del. 1978); W.L. May
Co. v. Philco-Ford Corp., 543 P.2d 283, 286-87 (Or. 1975).
37. Bernina Distrib., Inc. v. Bernina Sewing Mach. Co., 646 F.2d 434, 440 (10th Cir.
1981); Stanley A. Klopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co., 510 F. Supp. 807, 810 (E.D. Pa. 1981),
aff'd, 676 F.2d 688 (3d Cir. 1982); Cronk v. State, 420 N.Y.S.2d 113, 118 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
38. Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt, 430 S.W.2d 778, 781 (Ark. 1968).
39. U.C.C. § 2-302(2) (1987).
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agreements has risen.4 Although businesses use adhesion contracts to promote efficiency, this efficiency is often achieved at the
expense of the consumer. 4 ' As a result, courts must consider both
the appropriateness of forum selection clauses and their effect on
consumers.
B.

Supreme Court Cases InterpretingForum Selection Clauses

Traditionally, courts disfavored forum selection clauses and refused to enforce them, claiming that they were contrary to public
policy. 4 2 However, in 1972, the United States Supreme Court in
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. 43 reversed this precedent and

announced its acceptance of forum selection clauses. 4 The
Bremen decision encouraged courts to recognize the parties' choice
of forum 4 5 and set forth a reasonableness test that both federal and

state courts have used to determine the validity of forum selection
clauses. 46 According to Bremen, forum selection clauses are presumptively valid.47 The Court stated, however, that it would not
40. See Lenhoff, supra note 4, at 443.
41. Id. at 438.
42. See Note, Contracts-Exclusive Jurisdiction Provision in Bill of Lading Held
Valid, 25 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 133, 134 (1956) ("exclusive jurisdiction contracts have
found little popularity in the United States"); e.g., Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The SS
Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300-01 (5th Cir. 1958) (holding that agreements whose object is
to oust a court of jurisdiction will not be enforced) cert dismissed, 359 U.S. 180 (1959).
See generally ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 41 (1962) (discussing
opposition to agreements to oust a court of its jurisdiction); EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER
HAY, CONFLIcr OF LAWS § 11.3 (1982) (discussing how courts have considered such
agreements to violate public policy).
Generally, courts refused to enforce forum selection clauses because they would oust a
competent court of jurisdiction. As Arthur Corbin noted:
It is a generally accepted rule in the United States that an express provision in a
contract that no suit shall be maintained thereon, except in a particular court or
in courts of a particular county, state, or nation, is not effective to deprive any
court of jurisdiction that it otherwise would have over litigation based on that
contract.
6A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1445 (1962).
43. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
44. Id. at 10; see also Robert A. de By, Note, Forum Selection Clauses: Substantive or
Proceduralfor Erie Purposes, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1068, 1083 (1989) (noting that "The
Bremen has led to a turnabout").
45. See de By, supra note 44, at 1083.
46. According to the Bremen Court, the correct approach in deciding a case involving the enforceability of a forum selection clause would be "to enforce the forum selection
clause specifically unless [the contesting party] could clearly show that enforcement
W ,ild LIV u11C42bUV*ir MIL Unjust, or Lnat tn ciause was invaid for such reasons as
fraud or overreaching." Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15; see also SCOLES & HAY, supra note 42,
§§ 11.5-11.6.
47. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15 ("[Iln light of present day commercial realities and ex-
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enforce a clause that was unreasonable, unjust, or involved fraud
or overreaching.48
Writing for the majority in Bremen, Chief Justice Burger first
focused on the experience and relative sophistication of the parties.4 9 The contract in Bremen was between two sophisticated businesses that freely negotiated the terms of the contract., 0 The Court
found no evidence of fraud, undue influence, or overreaching bargaining power.5" Furthermore, the Court determined that the parties were aware
of the effect of this agreement when formulating
52
the contract.
The Bremen Court also considered whether enforcement of the
forum selection clause would contravene a strong public policy
favoring the plaintiff's choice of forum. 53 In this case, the Court
found that considerations of public policy favored enforcement of
the clause. 54 Finally, the Court looked at whether the chosen forum was "seriously inconvenient, '"55 noting that the party seeking
to invalidate the clause needs to show that enforcement would be
so inconvenient as to deprive that party of its day in court. 6 The
Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to meet this burden and,
panding international trade we conclude that the forum clause should control absent a
strong showing that it should be set aside").
48. Id. Bremen was not the first case in which a court applied a reasonableness test to
determine the enforceability of a forum selection clause. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit used that test in William H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish Am.
Line, 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955).
49. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12.
50. Id. The Court noted that -It]he choice of... forum was made in an arm's-length
negotiation by experienced and sophisticated businessmen." Id. The Court further found
strong evidence that the presence of the forum selection clause was a prominent factor
that the parties considered while conducting their negotiations. Id. at 14.
51. Id. at 12. The Court deferred to the Fifth Circuit's finding that "this was not
simply a form contract with boilerplate language that Zapata had no power to alter." Id.
at 12 n.14.
52. Id. at 16. The Court noted that there was "strong evidence that the forum clause
was a vital part of the agreement, and it would be unrealistic to think that the parties did
not conduct their negotiations, including the fixing of monetary terms, with the consequences of the forum clause figuring prominently in their calculations." Id. at 14.
53. Id. at 15; see also Boyd v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., 338 U.S. 263 (1949) (finding
that a plaintiff's right to bring an action in any eligible forum is a protected right under
§ 5 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act).
54. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15-16 (holding that a freely negotiated contract between
German and American companies represented a reasonable effort to provide a neutral
forum of litigation and, therefore, that public policy dictated enforcement).
55. Id. at 16. The Court noted, however, that if the clause was freely negotiated and
the parties contemplated the claimed inconvenience, considerations of convenience
should not be used to defeat an otherwise valid forum selection clause. Id.
56. Id. at 18. In this respect, the Court found that the plaintiff could depose witnesses rather than having them testify in person. Id. at 19.
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therefore, that the case should be tried in London, England, pursuant to the forum selection clause."
Despite the Supreme Court's presumption of the validity of forum selection clauses in Bremen, a few states refused to follow suit,
claiming that such clauses violated public policy. 5 s This posed a
problem for federal courts sitting in diversity,59 who had to decide
whether to follow the law of a state that considers the clauses per
se invalid or to apply the reasonableness test in Bremen. The
United States Supreme Court attempted to resolve this dilemma in
Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.6°
In Ricoh, an Alabama corporation entered into an agreement
with a New Jersey manufacturer to market copiers.61 When the
Alabama corporation brought suit in an Alabama federal district
court, the New Jersey manufacturer moved to transfer under 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) 62 or, in the alternative, to dismiss or transfer for
improper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1406.63
The Supreme Court held that section 1404(a), and not the state
law, applied to the venue dispute.'M Moreover, the Court stated
that in determining a section 1404(a) motion to transfer, a forum
selection clause is merely one factor a court should consider; it is
not dispositive. 65 The Court did not, however, address the issue of
57. Id. at 18-19. The Court distinguished the case of two Americans agreeing to
litigate in a remote alien forum. Id. at 17. In such a case, "[t]he remoteness of the forum
might suggest that the agreement was an adhesive one, or that the parties did not have
the particular controversy in mind when they made their agreement; yet even there the
party claiming should bear a heavy burden of proof." Id.
58. See, e.g., Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Foster, 382 So. 2d 554 (Ala. 1980) (finding
such clauses to be invalid and unenforceable); Cartridge Rental Network v. Video Entertainment, Inc., 209 S.E.2d 132 (Ga. App. Ct. 1974) (finding that such provisions are
void); State ex rel. Gooseneck Trailer Mfg. Co. v. Barken, 619 S.W.2d 928 (Mo. App. Ct.
1981) (holding that the state court was not bound by the Bremen decision).
59. See de By, supra note 44, at 1071 (noting that "[t]he circuits are currently split on
the question of the applicable law for determining the enforceability of forum selection
clauses").
60. 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
61. Id. at 24.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988); see supra note 14.
63. Ricoh, 487 U.S. at 24. Section 1406 provides:
(a) The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the
wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.
(b) Nothing in this chapter shall impair the jurisdiction of a district court of
any matter involving a party who does not interpose timely and sufficient objection to the venne
28 U.S.C. § 1406 (1988).
64. Ricoh, 487 U.S. at 28.
65. Id. at 31. The Court held that "[t]he forum selection clause, which represents the
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which law the district court should apply when there is no federal
law on point.66
Thus, following the logic of Bremen and Ricoh, lower courts apply a predictable analysis when ruling on motions by defendants to
transfer actions due to forum selection clauses.67 A court first will
note the existence of the forum selection clause.68 Consistent with
the holding in Ricoh, the court then will state that the clause is
only one factor a court should consider in ruling on a motion to
transfer. 69 The court next will balance the three evaluative factors
of section 1404(a): the convenience of the parties, the convenience
of the witnesses, and the interest of justice. 70 Finally, the court will
determine the relative weight to afford the forum selection clause,
and then will rule on the motion to transfer. 7 '
Although this approach provides a predictable analysis, it also
leads to inconsistent results. Courts may find the forum selection
clause valid but nevertheless disagree as to how much emphasis
such a clause deserves. Further, while the Bremen rationale enparties' agreement as to the most proper forum, should receive neither dispositive consideration (as respondent might have it) nor no consideration (as Alabama law might have
it), but rather the consideration for which Congress provided in § 1404(a)." Id.; see also
G.H. Miller & Co. v. Hanes, 566 F. Supp. 305, 307 (N.D. Il. 1983) (clause is only one
factor a court should consider); Cutter v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 510 F. Supp. 905, 908-09
(E.D. Wis. 1981) (consideration of other criteria in addition to the forum selection clause
is appropriate to a motion under § 1404(a)); Full-Sight Contact Lens Corp. v. Soft
Lenses, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 71, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (forum selection clause is only one
factor a court considers).
66. For a discussion of the Ricoh opinion and the Erie question, see de By, supra note
44, at 1074-75. de By notes that following Erie, in the absence of an applicable federal
statute or rule, federal courts sitting in diversity should apply state law rather than the
federal common law set out in the Bremen reasonableness test. Id. at 1084.
67. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Burroughs Corp., 571 F. Supp. 545, 548-49 (N.D. Tex.
1982) (following the Bremen reasonableness test); Gordonsville Indus., Inc. v. American
Artos Corp., 549 F. Supp. 200, 205 (W.D. Va. 1982) (stating that application of Bremen
rule is appropriate); Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Broetje, 545 F. Supp. 362, 370 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (balancing convenience and fairness); Full-Sight Contact Lens Corp., 466 F. Supp.
at 73 (following the "correct approach").
68. See Nelson v. Master Lease Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1397, 1400 (D. Minn. 1991)
(noting that a forum selection clause is only one factor a court should consider in ruling
on a motion to transfer).
69. Id. at 1399 (citing Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988)).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988); see supra note 14; Full-Sight Contact Lens Corp., 466
F. Supp. at 74 (citing Plum Tree, Inc. v. Stockment, 488 F.2d 754, 757-58 (3d Cir. 1973)).
71. See Gruson, supra note 5, at 200 ("Courts give varying weight to the forumselection clause in their consideration of whether to transfer a case for alleged inconvenience."); see also Red Bull Assoc. v. Best W. Int'l Inc., 862 F.2d 963, 967 (2d Cir. 1988)
(finding that a forum selection clause deserves less weight in a civil rights case); Nelson,
759 F. Supp. at 1399-1400 (discussing prior cases determining the relative weight to afford a forum selection clause); National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Sanders, 271 F. Supp. 756,
761-62 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) (finding that the clause deserved "some weight").
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forces forum selection clauses between business parties as long as
they are not fraudulent or overreaching,7 2 the Bremen decision left
unclear whether this rationale extended to contracts between a
business and a consumer.
III.

DISCUSSION

Even though the Bremen opinion did not address the validity of
a forum selection clause contained in an adhesion contract between
a business and a consumer,7 3 courts nonetheless have applied the
Bremen reasonableness test to such cases. 74 Consequently, opposing views have arisen regarding the use of the reasonableness test
and the enforceability of forum selection clauses in adhesion contracts with consumers. One approach looks at the clause from the
viewpoint of the consumer and in many cases finds it unconscionable or violative of public policy. 75 The other approach stresses the
importance of business efficiency and upholds the clause as dispelling any confusion over where a party should bring suit, thus conserving judicial resources. 76 The cases discussed below illustrate
these opposing views.
A.

The Unconscionabilityof Forum Selection Clauses in
Consumer Contracts

In Williams v. Illinois State Scholarship Commission,77 the
plaintiffs brought a class action against the Illinois State Scholarship Commission ("ISSC") to enjoin it from filing loan collection
72. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972). See generally Sherk
v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 n. 14 (1974) (discussing when a forum selection
clause is the product of fraud), reh'g denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974); Hoes of Am., Inc. v.
Hoes, 493 F. Supp. 1205, 1208 (C.D. Ill. 1979) (forum selection clause was enforceable
absent evidence "that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust or that clause was
invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching").
73. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12, 15, 16; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 80 (1988). Section 80 states: "The parties' agreement as to the place of the
action will be given effect unless it is unfair or unreasonable." Id. Further, according to
comment c: "A court will entertain an action brought in violation of a choice-of-forum
provision if it finds that the provision was obtained by fraud, duress, the abuse of economic power or other unconscionable means." Id. § 80 cmt. c.
74. See, e.g., Yoder v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 756, 758-60 (E.D.
Va. 1986) (refusing to uphold the forum selection clause specifically because the factors
relied on in Bremen were not present in Yoder as a business and the consumer were
operating under a wide disparitv in bargainin nnPr)
75.
76.
77.

See infra part III.A.
See infra part III.B.
563 N.E.2d 465 (Ill. 1990).
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actions only in Cook County, Illinois.78 ISSC required Guaranteed
Student Loan ("GSL") borrowers to sign venue waiver clauses as a
condition of receiving a loan. 9 After this suit was filed, the Illinois
General Assembly amended section 30-15.12 of the School Code to
require ISSC to file all collection actions in Cook County,
Illinois.80
The plaintiffs claimed that both the statute and the forum selection clause violated public policy, and due process and equal protection under both the state and federal constitutions. 8' The trial
court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, finding that
ISSC's practices, as well as section 30-15.12 of the School Code,
were unconstitutional.8 2 Additionally, the court issued an injunction requiring ISSC to bring suit either in a defaulter's county of
residence or the county where the defaulter8 3obtained the loan, and
to cease using the unconstitutional clause.
In its discussion of the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment,
the trial court applied the balancing test articulated in Mathews v.
Eldridge"4 to determine whether the statute violated due process.85
Finding a due process violation, the trial court declared the statute
unconstitutional,86 and the defendants appealed to the Illinois
Supreme Court.

The Illinois Supreme Court began its analysis with the three Mathews factors. 87 Under the first factor, the court ruled that the
plaintiffs' fundamental right of access to the courts was deprived
78. Id. at 467. The plaintiffs claimed that Cook County was an improper venue because they did not reside in or obtain their loans in Cook County. Id.
79. Id. at 468.
80. Id. at 469. The amendment stated:
The Commission shall file any and all lawsuits on delinquent and defaulted student loans in the County of Cook where venue shall be deemed to be proper.
1987 Ill. Laws 3443, eff. Jan. 1, 1988 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, para. 30-15.12
(1989)) (amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, para. 30-15.12 (1985)) (emphasis added).
81. Williams, 563 N.E.2d at 467.
82. Id. The court also found that such practices violated public policy. Id. Furthermore, the trial court held that the "defendants had denied (the] plaintiffs their fundamental right of access to the courts by filing collection actions in a distant and inconvenient
forum and by not presenting a compelling interest in doing so." Id. at 469.
83. Id. at 467.
84. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). According to Mathews, to decide if a statute or governmental policy violates due process, a court must weigh three factors: 1) the private interest; 2)
the risk of erroneous deprivation along with the probable value of safeguards; and 3) the
government's interest. Id. at 335.
85. Williams, 563 N.E.2d at 469.
86. Id. at 469-70. A finding of unconstitutionality vests the losing party with a direct
right of appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 302(a)
(1985).
87. Williams, 563 N.E.2d at 473; see supra note 84 for the three Mathews factors.
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by ISSC's practice of bringing suit in a potentially distant and inconvenient forum.88 As to the second factor, the supreme court
found that any risk of an erroneous deprivation could be cured by
allowing the plaintiffs to defend themselves in a more convenient
forum. 89 As to the third factor, the court found the argument that
the government had an interest in standardizing its procedures to
keep costs down unpersuasive 0 According to the court, requiring
all default actions to be filed in Cook County, Illinois only added to
a substantial backlog. 9' Additionally, the court observed that the
least expensive location most likely would be where witnesses and
evidence are located, and that the attorney general, who would try
the case, has offices throughout the state. 92 The supreme court
concluded that all three factors weighed in favor of allowing the
plaintiffs to defend either where they reside or where they obtained
the loan.93
In addition, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the forum selection clauses were contrary to public policy. 94 Even though the

plaintiffs acknowledged the clauses and did not object to their presence, the court refused to enforce them. 95 Referring to the agreements as adhesion contracts, the court emphasized the inequality
of bargaining power between the parties and ISSC's policy of offering the loans on a "take it or leave it" basis. 96 Furthermore, the
88. Williams, 563 N.E.2d at 473-75. The court noted that such a practice resulted in
some plaintiffs being sued up to 290 miles away from where they resided and where they
obtained their loans. Id. at 468.
89. Id. at 475, 476-77. The court found that the amendment to § 30-15.12, supra
note 80, was in direct conflict with the intent of the Illinois general venue statute, ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-101 (1989), which is "to make it more convenient to litigate
the action by conducting the trial in the same venue where the transaction took place."
Williams, 563 N.E.2d at 478.
90. Williams, 563 N.E.2d at 481. The court noted that judging by the distribution of
the population within the state, nearly half of all suits would be in Cook County anyway.
Id. at 482.
91. Id. at 481-82.
92. Id. at 482.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 487. Adopting the reasoning of Calanca v. D & S Mfg. Co., 510 N.E.2d 21
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987), the court ruled that "[t]he adhesional nature of these GSL agreements also supports our conclusion that Calanca's reasoning requires voiding the forum
selection clauses they contain." Williams, 563 N.E.2d at 487.
95. Williams, 563 N.E.2d at 487.
96. Id.; see Colonial Leasing Co. v. Pugh Bros. Garage, 735 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1984)
(providing a similar case in federal court involving a lessor bringing actions against non-
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F. Supp. 305, 308 (N.D. Ill. 1983) ("If a forum selection clause is a part of a 'boiler-plate'
agreement, its significance is greatly reduced as such a classification indicates an inequality in the parties' bargaining power.").
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court focused on the effect of the clause on the parties and found
that it resulted in forum abuse, unfair burdening of a forum with
97
no relation to the litigation, and violations of public policy.
In so holding, the Williams court acknowledged that, under The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,98 such a forum selection clause
would be enforced unless trial in the contractual forum would, for
all practical purposes, deprive a party of its day in court. 99 In Wil'liams, however, the court found that the clause had the effect of
depriving the class members of their right to be heard.10o Therefore, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that forum selection
clauses in adhesion contracts are unconscionable and will not be
enforced. ''
The foregoing analysis in Williams is appealing in its simplistic
extension of the Bremen reasonableness test. In essence, forum selection clauses in adhesion contracts will not be enforced due to the
consumer's lack of bargaining power. However, this approach to
forum selection clauses in adhesion contracts was subsequently rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Carnival Cruise
0 2
Lines, Inc. v. Shute.1
B.

Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute

In CarnivalCruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, Eulala Shute, a Washington state resident, purchased a ticket for a cruise departing from
California.' 3 Carnival, a Panamanian corporation with offices
based in Florida, then sent Shute a ticket with the forum selection
clause printed on the back.'°4 Shute did not have the opportunity
to read the contract prior to purchasing the ticket and another
clause in the contract stated that the ticket was nonrefundable. 0 5
Thus, even if Shute had read the clause and objected to it, she
would have lost her money if she had chosen not to take the cruise.
97. Williams, 563 N.E.2d at 486 ("The forum selection clause in the case at bar results in the contravention of the policy underlying the general venue statute, ridiculous
long-distance forum abuse, and the unfair burdening of a forum not connected with the
litigation.").
98. 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972).
99. Williams, 563 N.E.2d at 486.
100. Id. at 487.
101. Id. The court found that the "defendant's use of venue waiver or forum selection clauses is contrary to public policy." Id.
102. 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
103. Id. at 1524.
104. Id.; cf Colonial Leasing Co. v. Pugh Bros. Garage, 735 F.2d 380, 381-82 (9th
Cir. 1984) (standard form lease with small print).
105. Shute, II1 S. Ct. at 1529 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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While the ship was in international waters off the coast of Mexico,
Shute slipped on a wet deck during a guided tour of the ship's
States
galley. 106 Shute sued Carnival for negligence in the United
10 7
Washington.
of
District
District Court for the Western
Carnival responded with a motion for summary judgment based
on the forum selection clause and the court's lack of personal jurisdiction. 108 The district court granted the motion without discussing the forum selection clause because it found that Carnival
lacked the requisite minimum contacts with Washington.' °1 The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the
district court had personal jurisdiction over Carnival and that the
forum selection clause should not be enforced.110 Following the
Bremen reasonableness test, the court of appeals concluded that
Ms. Shute did not freely bargain for the clause."I In addition, the
court of appeals noted that Shute was physically and financially
incapable of bringing suit in Florida, such that enforcement of the
violate due process by depriving
forum selection clause would
2
Shute of her day in court."
Addressing only the enforceability of the forum selection clause,
the United States Supreme Court held that the clause was reasonable and should be enforced." 3 Justice Blackmun, writing for the
majority," 4 gave little weight to the fact that this was a form contract, not subject to negotiation, and that there was a lack of bargaining parity. 'I Rather than applying the Bremen reasonableness
106. Id. at 1524.
107. Id.
108. Id. According to Carnival, Shute was required to bring suit in the State of Florida and the Washington district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Carnival. Id
109. Id. According to International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945), considerations of due process require that non-resident defendants have certain
minimum contacts with the forum state, so that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
110. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 897 F.2d 377, 387, 389 (9th Cir. 1990).
111. Id. at 388. According to the court of appeals, a forum selection clause in an
adhesion contract is not enforceable because it is not the subject of bargaining. Id. at
389. The court stated, "[b]ecause this provision was not freely bargained for, we hold
that it does not represent the expressed intent of the parties, and should not receive the
deference generally accorded to such provisions." Id.
112. Id. at 389. This conclusion was in line with the holding in The Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972), that a forum selection clause should not be
enforced if it would serve to deprive a party of his day in court.
113. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1527 ("In evaluating the reasonableness of the forum clause
at issue in this case, we must refine the analysis of The Bremen to account for the realities
of form passage contracts.").
114. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Souter joined in the opinion. Id. at 1524.
115. Id. at 1527. But see Matthiessen v. National Trailer Convoy, Inc., 294 F. Supp.
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test, the Supreme Court concluded that standard form contracts
generally are permissible even though they are not the subject of
6
negotiation.
The Court analyzed the clause by weighing the private and public interest factors used to decide a section 1404 motion to transfer."' With respect to the private interest factors, the Court
determined that Carnival had a strong interest in limiting the fora
in which it potentially could be subject to suit." 8 The Court reasoned that such a clause benefitted Shute because she paid less for
her ticket due to the savings Carnival enjoyed by limiting the fora
in which it could be sued.' ' 9
Addressing the public interest factors, the Court noted that the
clause dispelled any confusion about where to file suit, thus sparing
both litigants and the court the time and expense of pretrial motions to determine the correct forum. 20 The Court also looked to
the concept of fundamental fairness and concluded that Carnival
did not insert the clause in order to discourage litigation. 12 1 Furthermore, the Court stated that there was no evidence of fraud or
overreaching. 22 Unlike the Court in Bremen, 23 the Court in
1132, 1135 (D. Minn. 1968) (holding that the fact that a forum selection clause is not
bargained for is enough to characterize it as unreasonable).
116. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1527. Contra Colonial Leasing Co. v. Pugh Bros. Garage,
735 F.2d 380, 382 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that take it or leave it clause in a form contract is the type of unfair or unreasonable clause that should be invalidated); Yoder v.
Heinold Commodities, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 756, 759 (E.D. Va. 1986) (stressing that inequality of bargaining power and use of form contracts are important factors in determining whether to enforce a forum selection clause); Galli v. Travelhost, Inc., 603 F. Supp.
1260, 1263 (D. Nev. 1985) (refusing to enforce forum selection clause when evidence
indicated that it was not freely bargained for).
117. For a discussion of § 1404 motions, see JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 2.17 (1985). See also supra note 14; supra text accompanying note 70.
118. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1527 ("Because a cruise ship typically carries passengers
from many locales, it is not unlikely that a mishap on a cruise could subject the cruise line
to litigation in several different fora.").
119. Id. But see Rakoff, supra note 16, at 1234 (arguing that even if consumers benefit by lower prices, there is no guarantee that there has been an overall gain in social
welfare).
120. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1527.
121. Id. at 1528. The Court noted that "suggestion of such a bad-faith motive is
belied by two facts: [Carnival] has its principal place of business in Florida, and many of
its cruises depart from and return to Florida ports." Id. But see Yoder v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 756, 759 (E.D. Va. 1986) (noting that the effect of forum
selection clauses can be to deter consumers from suing large corporations in distant
forums).
122. Shute, I11 S. Ct. at 1528.
123. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1972). In Bremen, the
Supreme Court focused on factors that indicated Shute should have been decided the
other way. The Bremen Court stated the following regarding the case before it:
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Shute did not observe evidence that showed lack of fraud.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens 24 disagreed with the
majority's conclusion that the passenger was aware of the clause
and noted that a person could only become aware of the clause
after purchasing the ticket. 25 Because it was part of an adhesion
contract, Justice Stevens found the forum selection clause to be per
se unenforceable. 26 According to Stevens, such clauses are the
product of unequal bargaining power and undermine the strong
public interest in deterring negligent conduct. 27 Implicit in this
rationale is the notion that many potential plaintiffs would be unable to bring suit in Florida,1 2 a conclusion that directly opposed
the majority's finding that Florida was a convenient forum. 2
In addition, the dissent found the clause to be unreasonable be3
cause it lessened the potential plaintiff's ability to bring suit. 1
Rather than deferring to the interests of business, the dissent advocated a continuation of the Bremen reasonableness test 3' and recommended analyzing forum selection clauses in adhesion contracts
under the principle of unconscionability.
The choice of [the] forum was made in an arm's-length negotiation by experienced and sophisticated businessmen, ... [this was] a freely negotiated private
international agreement, unaffected by fraud, undue influence, or overweening
bargaining power .... [and t]here [was] strong evidence that the forum clause
was a vital part of the agreement, and it would be unrealistic to think that the
parties did not conduct their negotiations, including fixing the monetary terms,
with the consequences of the forum clause figuring prominently in their
calculations.
Id.
124. Justice Marshall joined in the dissent. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1529.
125. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens attached a copy of the passage ticket
to his dissent to illustrate that "only the most meticulous passenger is likely to become
aware of the forum selection provision." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 74 (N.J. 1960) (provision difficult to read).
126. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1531 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens based this
holding on traditional principles of federal admiralty law and the Limitation on Shipowner's Liability Act, 49 STAT. 1480, codified as amended, 46 U.S.C. ApP. § 183c (1988).
Id. at 1530 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
127. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1530 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 1532 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the forum selection clause "certainly lessens or weakens [Shute's] ability to recover for the slip and fall incident").
129. Id. at 1528; see Kline v. Kawai Am. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 868, 872 (D. Minn.
1980) (weight given to inconvenience depends on equality of bargaining power). But see
Full-Sight Contact Lens Corp. v. Soft Lenses, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 71, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(inconvenience is not a relevant factor if the agreement was entered into freely).
130. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1533 (Stevens. J.. divpntirg> Th^ _i__t,- izcic was an
individuai, not a large corporation, thus there would be a substantial added burden in a
trial at the opposite end of the country. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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IV. ANALYSIS
Following the Shute decision, a question remains as to whether
courts should refuse to enforce forum selection clauses in adhesion
contracts. The Supreme Court left other questions unanswered as
well. For example, the Supreme Court failed to decide which party
has the burden of proof in a motion to transfer-the plaintiff who
signed the forum selection clause but chose to ignore it by filing
suit in a different venue, or the defendant who would prefer the
transfer and who is the presumed beneficiary of the forum selection
clause.132 The Court also failed to set forth a test for determining
when a forum selection clause in an adhesion contract is
unconscionable.
A.

The Shute Decision's Failure to Adequately Consider
Reasonablenessfrom a Consumer's Point of View
The Shute opinion significantly favors the efficiency of business
over concerns about the unequal bargaining power of consumers.' 33 In its analysis, the Shute Court ignored the fundamental
principles of unconscionability. 134 Unlike Bremen in which the
Court stated the reasons why the contract was not the result of
fraud, 3 5 the Shute Court simply stated that there was no evidence
of fraud or overreaching
without pointing to any support for this
36
1
conclusion.
Further, under section 2-302 of the UCC which governs unconscionability, 137 the court must give the parties the opportunity to
132. See Gruson, supra note 5, at 200 (arguing that "under Bremen a court should
not dismiss or transfer an action on the basis that the contractual forum is inconvenient
for the defendant unless the defendant bears the same heavy burden of proof which the
plaintiff has to bear when he attacks the enforcement of a forum-selection clause").
133. According to the Shute Court:
Common sense dictates that a ticket of this kind will be a form contract the
terms of which are not subject to negotiation, and that an individual purchasing
the ticket will not have bargaining parity with the cruise line ....[We do not
adopt the Court of Appeals' determination that a nonnegotiated forum selection
clause is never enforceable simply because it is not the subject of bargaining.
Shute, 111 S.Ct. at 1527.
134. See supra notes 19-41 and accompanying text. Writing about the Ninth Circuit's decision in Shute, Judge Richard Posner noted, "[i]f ever there was a case for
stretching the concept of fraud in the name of unconscionability, it was Shute; and perhaps no stretch was necessary." Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372,
376 (7th Cir. 1990).
135. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1972); see relevant text
of Bremen quoted supra note 123.
136. Shute, 111 S.Ct. at 1528.
137. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1987). According to comment 1:
The basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial background

Loyola University Law Journal

[V:ol. 23

present evidence as to the commercial setting, purpose, and effect
of such a clause. In the Shute opinion, the Court focused solely on
the benefit Carnival received by having the forum selection clause.
It is clear that the drafting party benefits from a forum selection
clause.13 8 What the Court also must consider, however, are the
disadvantages to the consumer who is forced to agree to this
clause.
The Shute opinion emphasized that the knowledge of the consumer is irrelevant to the reasonableness of the contract. 3 9 Instead, the Court focused on reasonableness from the drafter's point
of view. The court of appeals concluded that Shute lacked the resources necessary to litigate in Florida; therefore, enforcement of
the clause would serve to deprive Shute of her day in court.'I° The
Supreme Court ignored the inconvenience and hardship to the consumer and validated the clause based on the reasonableness of the
drafter's business concerns. This reasoning, however, contradicts
the Court's earlier holding in Bremen which favored forum selection clauses only if the parties had equal bargaining power.
The differences between the Bremen and Shute decisions are numerous. In Bremen, the Court noted that the nature of the transaction was "far from routine."''
In the Shute case, however,
Carnival presumably sold thousands of similar tickets every week.
Also, in Bremen, the Court focused on the sophistication of the
parties involved and found that both parties were businesses with
equal bargaining power. 4 2 Conversely, neither party in Shute ever
suggested that Ms. Shute had the same knowledge and experience
as Carnival. Furthermore, the Bremen Court noted that the contract was not a form contract with boilerplate language that the
and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved
are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the
time of the making of the contract.... The principle is one of the prevention of
oppression and unfair surprise and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power.
Id. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (citations omitted).
138. See, e.g., Yoder v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 756, 759 (E.D. Va.
1986) (clause was inserted solely for the convenience of the defendant); Couch v. First
Guar. Ltd., 578 F. Supp. 331, 333 (N.D. Tex. 1984) (forum clause was inserted only for
the convenience of the defendant); Cutter v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 510 F. Supp. 905, 907-08
(E.D. Wis. 1981) ("it is safe to assume that the forum-selection clause is in the contract
for the convenience of the defendant and for no other reason").
139. This is shown by the fact that Shute could not have known of the forum selection clause until she was already bound to the term &c,!
f
C,1LL.
.ee supra text
accnmp-_y,'-

-ozt

IG3-05.

140. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 897 F.2d 377, 389 (9th Cir. 1990).
141. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13 (1972).
142. Id.
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plaintiff had no power to alter. 4 3 In sum, the very facts that were
absent in Bremen and which supported that Court's enforcement
of the forum selection clause, were present in Shute and, thus, required the Shute Court to disregard the forum selection clause.'"
Moreover, according to section 211(3) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, when looking at a standardized agreement, a
court should ask whether the party seeking enforcement of the
term had reason to believe that the adherent would not have assented to the contract if aware of the questionable term. 145 In the
case of a forum selection clause, it is unlikely that the plaintiff was
aware of the clause or of the consequences of agreement to it. A
typical customer focuses on such terms as the price, type of payment (cash or credit), and warranty terms.'46 It is unlikely that a
consumer will recognize the effect of agreeing to litigate in a preselected forum when signing the contract.14 7 On the other hand, it
is very likely that Carnival was aware of the objectionable nature of
the same clause in its contracts. At the time of the Shute decision,
there were at least twenty prior or pending personal injury cases
filed against Carnival in the plaintiff's choice of forum.' 4 8 This
143. Id. at 12-13.
144. Id. at 12-14; see relevant text of Bremen quoted supra note 123.
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981).
146. Rakoff, supra note 16, at 1226-27.
147. Id. at 1226 ("It is notoriously difficult for most people, who lack legal advice
and broad experience concerning the particular transaction type, to appraise these sorts
of contingencies.").
148. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Superior Court of Cal., 111 S. Ct. 1614 (1991);
Mount Olive Baptist Church Travel Club v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 848 F.2d 192
(6th Cir. 1988); Armstrong v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 787 F.2d 579 (1st Cir. 1986);
Goldberg v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 701 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1983); Heyl v. Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc., 625 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1980); Partesi v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.,
No. 90-276, 1990 WL 302890 (D.N.J. Nov. 26, 1990); Ostrowitz v. Carnival Cruise
Lines, Inc., No. 89 CV 2760, 1990 WL 127657 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 1990); Walker v.
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., No. 87-C-115, 1987 WL 28413 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 1987);
Stack v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., No. 86-5150, 1987 WL 16770 (D.N.J. Sept. 4, 1987);
Everett v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 269 (M.D. Pa. 1987); Putz v. Carnival Tours, Inc., No. 86-2213, 1987 WL 7674 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 1987); Clark v. Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc., No. C86-444TB, 1987 WL 16935 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 17, 1987); Alexander v. Carnival Tours, Inc., No. 86-A-1951, 1986 WL 14673 (D. Colo. Dec. 11, 1986);
Dirks v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 971 (D. Kan. 1986); Cilberto v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., No. 85-4017, 1986 WL 2560 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 1986); Wilkinson
v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 318 (S.D. Tex. 1985); Luby v. Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc., No. H-84-2036, 1985 WL 6420 (D. Md. Apr. 2, 1985); Catalana v.
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 18 (D. Md. 1984); King v. Carnival Cruise
Lines, Inc., No. 82-2791, 1984 WL 1423 (W.D. La. Mar. 9, 1984); Lasky v. Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc., 598 A.2d 29 (Pa. 1991).
This does not include the presumably large number of other cases that plaintiffs
brought in lower state courts which were dismissed and unreported.
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provides ample evidence that Carnival knew that consumers objected to the forum selection clause.
The Shute Court also refused to consider adequately the burden
to Shute in having to litigate in Florida. According to the Court,
passengers benefit from the presence of a forum selection clause by
having reduced fares.1 49 The Court focused on the overall benefit
consumers receive at the time of contracting, instead of the effect in
the event the consumer chooses to bring suit. The Court found
that Florida was not an inconvenient forum' 50 without ever considering Shute's resources and her ability to litigate in Florida. 1 ' Instead, the Court looked to the convenience to Carnival-a test
which again completely contradicts the purpose of the Bremen test.
B.

The PreferableApproach of Bremen and Williams
Courts should continue to apply the Bremen reasonableness test
when determining the enforceability of forum selection clauses in
consumer contracts. The Bremen Court recognized the value of
business efficiency, 5 2 but noted that concern for commerce should
not override considerations of fraud and unreasonableness. 5 3 In
Bremen, the forum selection clause was in a contract between two
sophisticated businesses. 5 4 This factor seemed to weigh heavily in
the Bremen Court's decision to enforce the clause. Yet, in the case
of an adhesion contract like the one in Williams, 5 5 it is clear that
the consumer lacked the ability to negotiate because the contract
was presented on a "take it or leave it" basis."5 6
This is not to suggest that businesses should never use standard
149. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522, 1527 (1991).
150. Id. at 1528.
151. Id. at 1527. The Court refused to defer to the court of appeals's finding that
Shute was "physically and financially incapable of pursuing this litigation in Florida"
because there was no reference to this in the district court opinion. Id at 1527-28.
152. The Bremen v. Zappa Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 12.
155. Williams v. Illinois State Scholarship Comm'n, 563 N.E.2d 465 (Ill. 1990); see
supra notes 77-101.
156. See Nicholas S. Wilson, Freedom of Contract and Adhesion Contracts, 14 Iwr'L
& COMp. L.Q. 172, 181-82 (1965) (observing that "the ability to demand special treatment is only meaningful when the value or amount of business is not completely insignificant in relation to the size of the offeror's business").
The United States Supreme Court has previously recognized the unfairness of an adhe:
sion contract forced upon a consumer. In New York Cent. R.R. v. Lockwn 1,t"rh
stated:
The carrier and his customer do not stand on a footing of equality. The latter is
only one individual of a million. He cannot afford to haggle or stand out and
seek redress in the courts .... He prefers, rather, to ... sign any paper the
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form contracts with consumers. As the Shute Court noted, the reality of business today mandates their use. 5 7 In this respect, there
are a variety of terms that a business may include in an adhesion
contract without violating public policy. A forum selection clause,
however, should not be one of those terms.
The Illinois Supreme Court in Williams was correct in concluding that forum selection clauses in adhesion contracts presented to
consumers are contrary to public policy.' 58 The savings that consumers enjoy from the presence of such clauses do not outweigh
the potential inequity of forcing consumers to sue in the business's
choice of forum. 59 Not only is this result unconscionable, it may
deny consumers due process of law.
In Williams v. Walker-Thomas FurnitureCo. ,"0 the court found
the average consumer knew little about the contract beyond the
amount of money in question and the general terms of payment.' 6 '
A typical consumer lacks the intent to agree to every specific clause
in fine print. 162 While a consumer typically is bound to the contract agreed to, courts will use the doctrine of unconscionability to
protect consumers from objectionable terms or practices. In many
cases, a forum selection clause in an adhesion contract may be an
objectionable term. Rather than focusing on the demands of business, courts should consider the effect on consumers and evaluate
forum selection clauses in adhesion63 contracts by considering
whether the effect is unconscionable.
C. A Valid Forum Selection Clause Should Be Dispositive When
Deciding a Motion to Transfer
Certainly, a forum selection clause in an agreement between two
carrier presents ....
In most cases, he has no alternative but to do this, or
abandon his business.
84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357, 359 (1873).
157. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522, 1527 (1991).
158. Williams, 563 N.E.2d at 487.
159. As Justice Stevens stated in Shute, "[tihe fact that the cruise line can reduce its
litigation costs... by forcing this choice on its passengers does not, in my opinion, suffice
to render the provision reasonable." Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1529 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
160. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
161. Id at 449.
162. See Spanogle, supra note 18, at 933 ("The traditional incantation by the court is
that the consumer is bound by what he signed, and the printed clauses control. This
doctrine violates the consumer's expectations to the extent that it does not represent his
understanding of the contract terms.").
163. See Williams v. Illinois State Scholarship Comm'n, 563 N.E.2d 465, 486 (Ill.
1990) (focusing on the effect that a forum selection clause has on the parties in light of the
public policy behind the general venue statute).
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relatively sophisticated businesses should be enforced.'" Such an
agreement is usually the product of negotiation between the parties. 6 Likewise, adhesion contracts generally are enforceable.
Adhesion contracts save businesses time and resources and generally should not be criticized. When adhesion contracts between a
consumer and a business contain forum selection clauses, however,
the result is neither fair nor reasonable.
In light of the Supreme Court's preference for encouraging business autonomy, 16 the Ricoh Court's conclusion that a valid forum
selection should only be one consideration when ruling on a motion to transfer, 161 should be overruled. If a court finds a contract
to be enforceable, there is no reason why the court should not enforce all of the terms as written.
Currently, a court will conclude that the parties' agreement to
litigate in a chosen forum is valid, yet nonetheless refuse to enforce
that term after considering the convenience of witnesses, or the interests of justice. The recent opinion in Nelson v. Master Lease
Corp. 168 is an excellent example of this paradox. In Nelson, the
court concluded that the forum selection clause was not unconscionable, yet refused to enforce the clause because the convenience
of the parties weighed in the plaintiff's favor. 169 In effect, the Nelson court removed the forum selection clause from the contract
despite its conclusion that the clause was valid.
The Shute opinion will inevitably result in confusion among the
federal and state courts that have dutifully applied the Bremen reasonableness test. In Shute, the Supreme Court failed to explain
why an adhesion contract presented to a consumer with virtually
no bargaining power on a "take it or leave it" basis was not based
on fraud and did not violate public policy. 70 As a result, courts
must now determine whether the Shute decision should be confined
164. See Friedman v. World Trans., Inc., 636 F. Supp. 685, 690 (N.D. Ill. 1986)
(holding that the Bremen exceptions do not apply to sophisticated individuals and
companies).
165. See In re Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. 588 F.2d 93, 95 (5th Cir. 1979) (finding that
the parties negotiated the contract and that the petitioner failed to prove that the chosen
venue was unreasonable); Advent Elecs., Inc. v. Samsung Semiconductor, 709 F. Supp.
843, 847 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (finding that the clause was part of a bargained-for contract
between two companies of significant size and experience); Giordano v. Witzer, 558 F.
Supp. 1261, 1265 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (observing that the plaintiffs were represented by counsel and the agreement gave the plaintiffs substantial rights).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 114-20.
io. Stewart urg., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 31 (1988).
168. 759 F. Supp. 1397 (D. Minn. 1991).
169. Id. at 1403.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 137-38.
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to its facts or whether forum selection clauses in virtually all adhesion contracts should be enforced.
In making this determination, courts should realize that adhesion contracts involving consumers are a special category meriting
greater protection. The Illinois Supreme Court in Williams recognized that enforcement of such clauses may result in a violation of
due process due to the hardship of the consumer being forced to
travel to an inconvenient forum.' l While Williams involved the
consumer as a defendant in a loan default action, the same principal should hold true when the consumer is a plaintiff. A consumer
with a valid claim against a business should not be precluded from
bringing suit by virtue of his or her signature on a standard form
contract containing a forum selection clause. When a business can
effectively immunize itself from suit by inserting a forum selection
clause in small print in a complex adhesion contract, the result is
unconscionable.
Certainly not all forum selection clauses are unconscionable. In
the case of a valid forum selection clause, the principle set forth in
Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.' 7 2 that a forum selection

clause should not be dispositive, should be overruled. Since the
forum selection clause is one of the contract terms, contract law
should control. If the parties agreed to the term and it is not unconscionable, then it should be applied without further discussion.
V.

PROPOSAL

A contract of adhesion is inherently different from a regular contract. 7 3 To protect the unwary consumer, courts interpreting forum selection clauses in contracts between businesses and
consumers should find the clauses prima facie unenforceable 17 4 and
place the burden on the business to demonstrate that the forum
171. Williams v. Illinois State Scholarship Comm'n, 563 N.E.2d 465, 473 (Ill. 1990).
172. 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
173. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 18, § 9-44; see also Couch v. First Guar.
Ltd., 578 F. Supp. 331, 333 (N.D. Tex. 1984) ("[J]ustice requires that a distinction be
drawn between freely negotiated contracts and standard form contracts").
174. See Rakoff, supra note 16, at 1176; see, e.g., Colonial Leasing Co. v. Pugh Bros.
Garage, 735 F.2d 380, 382 (9th Cir. 1984) (disregarding forum selection clauses in adhesion contracts); Yoder v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 756, 759 (E.D. Va.
1986) ("The court is wary of forum selection clauses that appear in form contracts between individuals and large corporations.").
Significantly, the original draft of § 2-302 of the U.C.C. on unconscionability was limited in its application to adhesion contracts. UNIFORM REVISED SALES ACT, § 23 (PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT No. 1, 1944), noted in Wilson, supra note 156, at 187 n.91. This
tends to prove that adhesion contracts should be closely scrutinized.
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selection clause is not unconscionable. 1 5 The following proposal
outlines the analysis a court should undertake when faced with a
forum selection clause in an adhesion contract. This proposal also
discusses the procedures a court should follow if it determines that
such a clause in an adhesion contract is not unconscionable.
When confronted with a motion to transfer to the forum specified by a forum selection clause in an adhesion contract, a court's
initial determination should be the enforceability of the clause.
The court must consider the bargaining power of the parties making the contract in order to determine whether the clause is unconscionable. 17 6 A court must look at both procedural and substantive
unconscionability.
For a typical consumer, being forced to litigate in an inconvenient forum prevents the filing of suit. 177 In order to protect consumers, courts should place the burden on businesses to prove that
a consumer understood the consequences of agreeing to such a
clause. 7 The problem with a forum selection clause in adhesion
contracts is not only the consumer's lack of knowledge, but also
the inability to bargain over such a term. 79 Businesses have a duty
175. As one author argues, "many terms that might be enforceable if included in
negotiated agreements should not be enforced if imposed through contracts of adhesion,
quite simply because they exacerbate the authoritarian relationship inherent in the use of
such forms." Rakoff, supra note 16, at 1266.
Currently, adhesion contracts are not the subject of heightened scrutiny. See Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 375 (7th. Cir. 1990) (noting that prior
decisions "treat a forum selection clause basically like any other contractual provision").
According to the court in Donovan, the facts of Shute were unique and forum selection
clauses in adhesion contracts should not be subject to a heightened scrutiny for unconscionability. Id. at 377.
176. According to the court in Donovan, "[i]f a clause really is buried in illegible 'fine
print'--or if as in Shute it plainly is neither intended nor likely to be read by the other
party-this circumstance may support an inference of fraud." 916 F.2d at 377; see also
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 85 (N.J. 1960) ("the courts must
examine purchase agreements closely to see if consumer and public interests are treated
fairly").
177. See Yoder, 630 F. Supp. at 759 ("[Wihere the clause requires the filing of a suit
in a distant state it can serve as a large deterrent to the filing of suits by consumers against
large corporations.").
178. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 18, § 9-44.
179. See Mueller, supra note 17, at 581; see also Galli v. Travelhost, Inc., 603 F.
Supp. 1260, 1263 (D. Nev. 1985) (finding no evidence that the parties engaged in any
bargaining over the clause); Couch v. First Guar. Ltd., 578 F. Supp. 331, 334 (N.D. Tex.
1984) (stating that nearly all cases refusing to enforce a forum clause rely on the disparity
in bargaining power); Cutter v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 510 F. Supp 905, 908 (E.D. Wis.
_9) _'hUD wa nut ireeiy oargainea tor); Kolendo v. Jerell,
Inc., 489 F. Supp. 983, 986 (S.D. W. Va. 1980) (relying on disparate bargaining power to
deny the defendant's motion to dismiss for improper venue due to forum selection
clause).
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to deal with consumers in a fair and open manner' 8° which should
include notifying consumers of the forum selection clause and its
effect. A finding as to unconscionability, however, does not end
the court's analysis.
If the court determines that the clause is not unconscionable and
hence enforceable, then the court should enforce the clause and
grant the motion to transfer. A valid clause should not be merely
one factor that a court looks at when deciding a section 1404(a)
motion to transfer, it should be dispositive.18 ' According to general principles of contract law, the court should give effect to the
reasonable expectations of the parties.182 As long as it is not unconscionable, a valid forum selection clause should negate considerations of convenience and the interest of justice.
In contrast, if a forum selection clause is found to be unconscionable, the court then should decide the motion to transfer as if
the forum selection clause were not present. This approach is consistent with both section 211(3) of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts'83 and section 2-302(1) of the Uniform Commercial
Code. 8 4 Thus, the court should consider the convenience of the
parties, the convenience of witnesses, and the interest of justice, as
it would in any other case.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Public policy requires that, at the very least, a business using an
adhesion contract should have the duty to ensure that a consumer
is aware of the forum selection clause prior to entering into the
agreement.' 85 This does not impose a substantial burden on the
business when weighed against the potential harm a consumer
might face if forced to litigate in an inconvenient forum.
According to the Shute decision, the Supreme Court believes a
180. See Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 88 (discussing cases in which a limitation of liability was not given effect because it was "not brought to the buyer's attention and he was
not made understandingly aware of it," thus violating the duty of fairness).
181. According to Gilbert, supra note 17, at 11, in a motion to dismiss on the ground
of forum non conveniens, the presumption is against dismissal and in favor of the plaintiff's choice of forum. Gilbert argues that "[t]he presumption should be reversed in the
choice of forum context to favor the parties' choice absent other indications of unreasonableness." Id.
182. 1 CORBIN, supra note 42, § 1.
183. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981).
184. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1987).
185. Seabrook v. Commuter Hous. Co., 338 N.Y.S.2d 67, 73 (Civ. Ct. 1972) (explaining that unconscionability imposes the duty on the party with bargaining superiority to
explain to the inferior party any provision that is one-sided).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 23

desire for business efficiency should override any concern a court
might have for protecting individuals. 8 6 This conclusion opens
the door to businesses forcing consumers to consent to a variety of
unconscionable practices, all in the name of business efficiency.
JULIE HOFHERR BRUCH
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